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Cooperation among stakeholders is widely accepted as an eﬀective management strategy. This paper describes an experimental
study that explores this cooperation using role-playing games, which is formulated within a multiagent simulation framework.
This framework enables participants to take active roles in mimicking the collaborative decision environment and the behaviors
and attitudes of the diﬀerent stakeholders. The paper examines a forest plantation company in South Sumatra, Indonesia, which
has cooperated with local communities since 2000. The experimental pilot study described in this paper explored the role of
communication in partnership relationships between the company and the local communities living within and around the
surroundings of the company’s plantation. These partnerships were explored and analyzed using the gaming approach involving
university students taking the role of forest stakeholders, from both the timber company and the local communities. Lessons
learned from the game provided the rationale for the establishment of a communication institution called “Forum Sebahu Sejalan.”
This formal forum was constituted after a facilitated ex-postinteraction between representatives from the timber company and
local communities. Results and observations drawn from the interactions show the potentials of the RPG approach and the formal
forum in crafting resilient partnerships among stakeholders.
Copyright © 2009 Herry Purnomo et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
1. Introduction
Principle 22 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development highlights the importance of local
people and their participation in sustainable development.
In forestry, this often applies to indigenous people or
communities living within or nearby forest concession
areas. Consequently, participatory management approaches
have been devised to strengthen the capacity of local
forest communities and enhance their capability to be
engaged in participatory management. These approaches
often involve diﬀerent ways of empowering local com-
munities by allowing them to be actively involved in
planning and decision making. This paper describes an
experimental pilot study that examined participatory man-
agement using role-playing games (RPG) formulated within
a multiagent simulation framework where participants take
active roles mimicking the collaborative decision environ-
ment and the behaviors and attitudes of the diﬀerent
stakeholders.
1.1. Forest Plantations, Pulp Industries, and Land Disputes.
Indonesia’s pulp and paper industry has rapidly expanded
since the late 1980s. The 1998 economic crisis temporar-
ily slowed the rate of expansion, but by 2000 several
pulp mills were established. Disputes over land between
local and customary communities and forest companies
during the Soeharto era (i.e., New Order regime, 1966–
1998) were suppressed by military force. Soeharto’s res-
ignation, and the subsequent political transition in May
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1998, spawned the beginning of community movements
demanding that customary rights be restored, including
communal land rights. Conflicts arose as local communities
and companies clashed over (1) the land appropriation
process, (2) environmental impacts, and (3) recruitment of
employees [1].
1.2. Multiagent Simulation and Role-Playing Game. For
better management planning purposes, forestry planners and
policy makers should be able to assess the long-term impacts
of major activities or policies such as establishing plantations,
or cooperation among stakeholders. Simulation is one way
to explore long-term impacts; in fact, it may be the only
viable tool for making impact assessments particularly if the
forest system is large or too complex. Simulation generally
involves the process of developing a simplified representation
of a real-world situation (called the simulation model),
and “animating” it so that stakeholders can envision future
scenarios.
Multiagent simulation (MAS) is a promising tool for
examining natural resource management alternatives, and
for analyzing environmental management issues [2]. MAS
has desirable features that make it an appropriate “analytical
platform” for the participatory natural resource manage-
ment. It is flexible and can accommodate many stakeholders,
and it is robust enough to embrace diﬀerent management
options and types of decision-making procedures and pro-
cesses.
In general, cooperation among stakeholders can occur
naturally only when individuals cannot pursue their goals
on their own. Agents or actors may communicate among
themselves when they are interested to seek cooperation in
order to achieve a shared goal [3, 4], even when economic,
social, or political objectives may diﬀer. Cooperation is a
dynamic concept that evolves over time, but may or may
not survive broader economic and social trends and changes.
Hence, Axelrod and Cohen [5] have examined the need for
adaptive capacities among all stakeholders involved in the
cooperative process.
Information and communication technology has made
the world an increasingly complex, yet smaller, place. Forest
stakeholders now have better access to information. They
also view themselves and others to have to deal with more
variables, issues, and concerns in order to manage their
forests more eﬀectively. With more and better information,
forest stakeholders are now in a position to examine and
possibly improve cooperative arrangements and institutions.
While cooperation should be adaptive, it also needs a certain
amount of resilience to be eﬀective in a dynamic world. Role-
playing games (RPGs) are a useful approach to scrutinize
partnership and cooperative arrangements and examine the
capacity for adaptation.
In general terms, a game is an action that triggers a reac-
tion, which then triggers further action and more reaction.
COMMOD [6] defined a game as (a) a free activity, (b)
having imaginative components, (c) bounded by space and
time, (d) a trigger group discussion, and (e) a mimic normal
behavior. Behind a game is a body of knowledge called “game
theory,” which spells out how rational individuals make a
decision when they are interdependent. In game theory,
individualism, rationality, and interdependency are some of
the basic theoretical constructs that predicate the behavior
and dispositions of the players [7].
Role-playing game is specifically designed for the inter-
action between players based on the roles they play [8, 9].
Through the RPG, one can observe the way roles are played,
how actions and decisions of players impact other players’
behavior and decisions, and the impacts to the decision
environment. During the game, each player is allowed to
act collectively, to contribute in creating new institutions or
rules among the players, or to achieve common goals. When
the game is over, each player can analyze the lessons learnt
and compare the game to the real world. The game’s realism
may take one of several forms (a) explicit reality, where RPG
presents the actors’ real situation and their resources; (b)
implicit reality, where RPG represents a simplified version of
actors and their resources; (c) virtual world, where RPG is
based on an issue which is not necessary related to a specific
actor or resource [6].
Ostrom et al. [9] distinguished between cooperative and
noncooperative games. In cooperative games, players can
communicate freely and make enforceable agreement; in
noncooperative games, they can do neither. Communication
and information sharing among players may produce col-
laboration. Ca´rdenas and Ostrom [10] proposed three layers
of information in deciding about their level of cooperation
in three rural villages of Colombia. The layers range from
material incentives to the composition of the group and the
individual characteristics of the player.
Recognizing the importance of collective action in natu-
ral resource management in developing countries, Meinzen-
Dick et al. [11] provided an overview of studies that present
applications of qualitative, quantitative, experimental, and
action research methods including experimental games for
studying collective action. Pacheco et al. [12] promoted
the capability of a game to develop a strategy to help
organizations deal with various challenges, and also as a
strategy to increase global awareness about environmental
issues and to build environmental responsibility. The game is
an innovative tool that can be used to develop a coordinated
strategy among diﬀerent actors. Such strategy may also lead
to the development of new institutions and revitalize existing
ones. For instance, Atran et al. [13] described how actors
with diﬀerent mental models of conceptualizing nature aﬀect
their behaviors, strategy, and actions. These mental models
have implications for environmental decision-making and
management, including forestry common property prob-
lems.
The failure of forest owners and managers to prohibit
user groups from exploitative extraction of forest resources
has forced them to opt for a collaborative management
approach, termed as joint management [14] or out-grower
scheme in forest plantations [15]. Platteau and Gaspart
[16], however, have indicated that the main diﬃculties of
community-driven development lie in their vulnerability to
situations where local elites capture much of the benefits.
It has also been noted that too quick and massive rush
to community-driven development may prove self-defeating
International Journal of Forestry Research 3
in the sense that benefits actually reaching the poor may
be lower than expected if donor agencies are impatient
and do not allow time for institutions to develop [16].
Local democracy often shapes social and environmental
sustainability. Representation in decision making, a trade-
mark of democracy, is the mechanism that can lead to
eﬃciency, equity, and the elusive sustainability goal promised
by decentralized and community-oriented forms of natural
resource management. One prerequisite condition of this
representation in decision-making is local peoples’ capacity
to participate and capability to engage the local elite
[17].
Enhancing the capacity of local communities requires
the establishment of enabling institutions which have to
be perceived as credible by social actors. In other words,
institutional functionality relies on its social acceptability or
credibility [18]. Focusing on institutions is also advocated by
Agrawal and Gibson [19], who suggested that concentrating
on institutions rather than the community is likely to be
more fruitful and eﬀective in advancing community-based
natural resource management.
1.3. Context of Pilot Study. Musi Hutan Persada (MHP) is
an Acacia mangium plantation company located in South
Sumatra, Indonesia. MHP is a joint venture composed of the
state-owned company Inhutani II and the private companies
Barito Pacific Timber, Muktilestari Kencana, and Marubeni
Corporation. MHP operates under the Indonesian Minister
of Forestry Decree No. 38/Kpts-II/1996, dated 29 January
1996. The MHP plantations cover a total of 296 400 hectares
across three noncontiguous sites in South Sumatra (see
Figure 1).
Communities surrounding MHP are mostly made up of
traditional farmers. Other members of the local communities
are MHP workers, traders, and local government oﬃcials.
The farmers grow rubber, rice, and Acacia mangium in
collaboration with MHP. The local people customarily
organized themselves according to the traditional “Marga”
system. Based on customs and traditions, the “Marga” system
generated communal rules and norms for utilizing resources
in a specific territory. This system broke down in the early
1980s; consequently, collective livelihood actions are now
rare.
In 1998, Indonesia faced an economic, social, and
political crisis due to the political transition that ensued
following the change in political power at the national level.
The crisis aﬀected all development sectors, including MHP
forest plantations which were established two years earlier.
Villages surrounding the plantations began to ask MHP
for more benefits, or for their share from the company’s
economic profits derived from extracting timber from the
forest. This led to conflict between the company and local
people. To ease tensions, MHP developed two cooperative
schemes: “Managing Forest with Community” (MHBM or
Mengelola Hutan Bersama Masyarakat) and “People Forest
Management” (MHR or Mengelola Hutan Rakyat).
The MHBM area is about 40 000 hectares and involves
12 villages. In this scheme, the timber company pays the
communities some royalty fees from the MHP plantations
on its concession land. The fee amounts to Rp. 2 500
(US$1 = Indonesian rupiahs 11 000 (Rp. or IDR)) per cubic
meter of log. Although MHBM is called a partnership
scheme, it was found that the scheme involves MHP giving
direct aid to the communities.
MHR is closer to the partnership spirit, with an out-
grower scheme for smallholder plantations. The MHR area
is about 4000 hectares and involves eight villages. Individuals
or groups can propose to MHP to plant trees on their own
land, regardless of its status. If MHP approves, the company
will provide all establishment and maintenance costs for
small plantations from 2 to 100 hectares. Profits are shared
60% to MHP, and 40% to the individual or group.
2. Development of the Game
In the case study, villagers living around the MHP plantations
may or may not participate in a partnership in seven diﬀerent
ways (a) small-scale Acacia mangium cultivation (out-grower
scheme), (b) planting rubber, (c) maintaining old rubber,
(d) growing oil palm, (e) providing labor for MHP, (f)
growing small-scale mixed-plantation, and (g) looking for
rent opportunities. By comparison, the company manages
its big Acacia plantation, participates in the partnership, and
manages its employees.
The game’s goal is to improve local welfare by giving
communities an insight into how to construct their liveli-
hood strategies. The objectives are (a) to share knowledge
with local communities about livelihood strategies and (b)
to help collective decision making on self-organization,
cooperation, and coordination to achieve the common
goal.
The general modeling process and the pilot study
followed the following steps: (a) represent the MHBM and
MHR in the game; (b) test and engage the stakeholders
in refining the model; (c) conduct role-playing game; (d)
develop future scenarios; (e) develop rational collective plans
and actions. This paper describes the experiment conducted
under the first four steps. To facilitate the modeling process,
a “companion modeling approach” with a modeling tool,
namely, Common Pool Resources and Multi-Agent System
(CORMAS) was adopted. CORMAS is a multiagent simu-
lation platform specifically designed for renewable resource
management systems [20, 21].
Prior to developing the game, the authors visited the sites
and had several discussions with stakeholders to get a first-
hand understanding of the context. This game is to be played
at the community level; in other words, the community’s
perspective is at the core of the game. The stakeholders were
identified according to the following criteria: proximity to
the forest, legal or traditional rights over the forest, and
dependence on the forest.
The game used implicit reality, meaning it is based on
a simplified representation of actors, resources, and land
management relevant to the players, in this case MHP. This
approach oﬀers more advantages than explicit reality in terms
of (a) avoiding issues sensitive to some community members,
such as the boundary between community and MHP land
and (b) providing higher flexibility in the game.
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Figure 1: MHP’s forest plantation concession in South Sumatra Province (inset Indonesia).
Two types of stakeholders were identified, namely, the
local communities, and the MHP with its land concession
planted with Acacia mangium. In formulating the “rules” of
the game, the focus was more on the roles of the communities
in the partnership rather than MHP. Some of the community
members have traditional lands so that they can enter into
MHR partnership, or grow trees such as rubber and oil palm.
Community members without land can work as laborers of
MHP, rubber tappers, or do oﬀ-farm jobs.
2.1. Spatial Setting of the Playing Field. Figure 2 describes the
spatial setting of the game. The spatial context of the game
is a landscape that comprises 25 cells. Each cell represents
10 hectares. There are two land categories, namely, company
Acacia plantation and the community’s small, old, and
unproductive rubber plantations.
2.2. Players and Their Decision Spaces. There are two cat-
egories of community players: villagers with, and villagers
without land. They are all located within the communities.
The game is played with six people as landowners (LOs) and
four as nonland owners (NLOs). The proportional numbers
of LOs and NLOs were intended to balance power and reflect
real situation in the field.
LOs may manage their land, participate in MHBM, and
work for the company, or become company laborers. These
three options are not mutually exclusive. It means that they
1 2 3 4 5
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21 22 23 24 25
Figure 2: Game spatial setting with community land (bottom) and
MHP forest concession (top).
may choose more than one option at the same time. The
first option, managing the land, comprises three suboptions:
keeping the old rubber trees, selling the land, or replanting
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Figure 3: Use case diagram of the game.
it with Acacia mangium, oil palm, a new rubber variety, or
mixed plantation.
NLOs do not have many options. NLOs may participate
in MHBM or provide company labor. Both LOs and NLOs
may also become free riders or rent seekers in this game.
Table 1 shows a simplified payoﬀ for managing the land
for over 20 years. The simple payoﬀ table describes the
investment (I) and economic return (R) at the strategic level
represented by the strategic choices available to the villagers
with and without land. Hence, the payoﬀ table shows the
amount invested when the strategic option is chosen, and
the expected return from the strategic option at a given
time in the future (e.g., rotation). In the case of the MHBM
partnership scheme, there is no investment required from
the local community to get a return of rupiahs 5 million
(i.e., royalty) at the end of an Acacia eight-year rotation.
MHR partnership scheme requires land and investment of
Rp 2 million at the beginning of the year in order to gain a
return of Rp 80 million at the end of the rotation. Preserving
old and unproductive rubber plantation costs nothing but it
will produce insignificant income. Investing in new varieties
of rubber and oil palm involves significant costs estimated
at about rupiahs 60 million which is generally unaﬀordable
for individual farmers although such investment can yield
significant economic returns. Mix plantation takes longer
rotations than an acacia plantation, but it can yield higher
values particularly with respect to biodiversity.
In this experiment, the game is intended to represent the
local community’s strategies in improving their livelihoods
under options and rules created by MHP such as MHR and
MHBM partnership arrangements. It also provides a way to
analyze how communication and collaboration can improve
the local community’s livelihood strategies. It focuses on the
dynamic relationships among local communities rather than
with MHP. Hence, the company at this RPG stage is perceived
as “typical” or in a “ceteris paribus” sense.
The company can play roles such as: reformulating
the benefit-sharing arrangement of MHBM and MHR,
considering planting options other than Acacia, or changing
the acceptance number of MHR applicants. In the current
game, MHP only accepts four players with MHR proposal
applications, which represents, and is commensurate with,
the limit of MHP’s funding for joint venture with local
communities. MHP can increase this limitation by accepting
more MHR proposals. In such cases, the local community,
as rational players, can react by implementing a diﬀerent
strategy as they attempt to maximize their benefit in light of
the company’s changing policy.
2.3. Playing the Game. The diagram of the game context is
shown in Figure 3. The figure represents a forest plantation
partnership within a bounded system with the categories of
actors involved: communities, and the company, in this case
the MHP. The diﬀerent options for local communities and
the company are also described.
Initially, each player has 10 million rupiahs as their first
liquid resource. As soon as the game starts, the LO has a
cell to decide. NLO has to decide whether to participate in
MHBM. Then, LO has to choose a land management option.
As described in Table 1, each option has consequences in
terms of investment and return.
The game is designed to be played following the sequence
A, B, and C. The general challenge and objective of the
players are to maximize the total returns, specifically cumu-
lative revenue, in twenty time-steps, representing 20 years.
Scenario A is designed to explore the situation where there is
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Table 1: Investment (I) and return (R) in millions rupiahs.
Year
MHBM partnership MHR partnership Preserving old Growing new clones Growing oil Growing mix
scheme scheme rubber of rubber palm plantation
I R I R I R I R I R I R
1 0 0 2 0 0 0 60 0 90 0 20 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 0 90 2 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 0 90 2 0
8 0 5 0 80 0 0 0 60 0 90 2 0
9 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 60 0 90 2 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 0 90 2 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 0 90 2 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48 0 72 2 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48 0 72 2 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48 0 72 2 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48 0 72 2 0
16 0 5 0 80 0 0 0 48 0 72 2 0
17 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 48 0 72 2 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 0 54 2 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 0 54 2 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 0 54 20 600
no communication among the players. In scenario B, players
are divided into two groups (NLOs and LOs), and each
group is organized into communication and collaboration
subgroups. Finally, in scenario C, all players are in the same
group; hence, they are able to communicate and possibly
collaborate, if the players believe it will serve their own
individual and collective interests.
The company can only aﬀord four players to participate
in the MHR scheme during the game. If there are more than
four players who apply for the MHR scheme, the company
will randomly choose and approve four.
Landscape diversity, an important indicator that should
be monitored, can be calculated using average cell diversity
following a simple algorithm as follows: (a) if a cell is a mix
plantation, then the cell diversity is equal to 100%; (b) if it is
not a mix plantation, then the cell diversity is calculated by
dividing the number of cell neighbors that have diﬀerent land
uses with the number of total neighbors; hence, cell diversity
is between 0 and 100%. Cell diversity aﬀects fire risk in the
area; hence, it should be monitored. If a cell has low cell
diversity and it is planted with Acacia, then the probability of
fire is high. Fire can spread out through the Acacia plantation
cells via connected edges.
During and after the game, the game facilitator took
note and presented the expected revenues to the players, the
land diversity, and the emerging institutions in A, B, and C
scenarios. The facilitator and the players can then react, share
their views, and discuss the overall situation, including the
need for institutions which may emerge during the game.
3. Results and Discussion
The game was pilot tested using university students at Bogor
Agricultural University, Bogor, Indonesia. The experimental
game was pilot tested with university students. The students
were chosen in part because they are able to freely and
genuinely express their ideas about the community’s future
livelihood options without being connected to these options.
They are also able to quickly detect what livelihood options
can improve the community’s local economy. This situation
supports the underlying assumption of the game (i.e.,
economic rationality). Using students in the experimental
game has resulted in the improvement of the game due to
the students’ critical thinking skills. Students can be easily
transformed into good game players in a virtual world
such as in participatory simulation equipped with rules,
experimentation, and scenario development in Colella [22].
Nevertheless, the students can be biased in their thinking
about livelihoods vis-a`-vis conservation. They may tend
to be more idealistic than villagers in terms of putting
conservation as more important than livelihoods. On the
other hand, villagers are usually more deeply connected to
their current works and life situations, and they tend to be
less concerned about long-term consequences of diﬀerent
options without intensive facilitation. Intensive facilitation is
necessary to ensure that they understand all possible options.
The experiment aimed at observing how the RPG
approach, and the CORMAS-based model developed perfor-
mance under the conditions of “implicit realism” described
International Journal of Forestry Research 7
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 14 15
16 17 18 19 20
21 22 23 24 25
Figure 4: Scenario A: four players participate in MHBM scheme
and the other four players participate in MHR scheme.
in Section 1.3. Hence, the RPG-CORMAS model was devel-
oped to reflect, as “close” as possible, the “rules,” attitudes,
behaviors, perspectives, and views of the local communities
as observed and noted by the researchers during field visits
to the site. Before doing the RPG study, the participants
were briefed about RPG, what the experimental pilot study
is about, the issues to be examined, and their “roles” in
the RPG. The participants were not instructed, or guided
in any way, about how the game was to be played by them.
It was explained to them, however, that the objective of
the experiment was to empirically examine “community-
company partnerships,” particularly diﬀerent partnership
arrangements and their relationships in the context of
managing the resource. The participants were also asked to
be available and participate throughout the stages, iterations,
and applications of the RPG process.
To simplify the analysis, the players considered revenues
from land management as the sole income source. The cost
of money, such as commercial (bank) and noncommercial
rates, was also not included in the analysis.
3.1. Scenario A: No Communication among the Game Players.
The LO players do not have enough capital individually to
invest in their land separately. As a result, six players tried
to grow Acacia under the MHR scheme, but only four were
accepted by MHP (Figure 4—cells 19, 20, 22, and 24). The
four NLO players located on the concession land followed the
MHBM scheme (cells 4, 6, 7, and 11). The total cumulative
revenue for 20 years amounts to rupiahs 756 million for 10
players (see Table 2). As an initial approach, the total net
revenue was chosen as a marker to compare the scenarios.
As shown in Table 2, the cumulative revenue of 40
million rupiahs for the four NLO players is calculated from
their 10 million rupiahs initial capital. At year 8, Acacia
reaches its rotation age and is harvested. Hence, each NLO
player received a return (i.e., royalty) of 5 million rupiahs.
Therefore, beginning year 9, the cumulative income of the
four NLO players is 60 million. The 6 LO players, on the
other hand, had 60 million initial capital. Four invested on
the MHR scheme costing 8 million, and hence the cumulative
revenue in year 1 is 52 million. At year 8, the Acacia planted
is harvested; hence, the 4 LO players received a return of 320
million rupiahs.
Without communication, there was no opportunity for
the players to pool their capital. Given the amount of capital
each player has, joining MHR scheme was the rational
choice for the LO players. Two LO players wanted but
were not accepted to the MHR scheme because only four
MHR applications are allowed by the company. NLO players
kept their capital since they have no land to invest under
the MHR scheme. Working individually, in fact, reflects
the current situation in the communities surrounding the
plantations. Lack of eﬀective communication and trust
made them act individually in dealing with their own
livelihoods.
3.2. Scenario B: Communication and Collaboration within
Each Group of Players. In scenario B, the LO and NLO players
could communicate and collaborate within their groups.
After some discussions, the two groups came up with two
strategies. The NLO players representing the communities
without land stayed with the MHBM scheme (Figure 5—
cells 2, 5, 7, and 16). Hence, there was no change in their
cumulative revenues as shown in Table 3. The LO players
representing communities with land agreed to invest all
their money in rubber plantations (see Figure 5, cell 23).
Establishing rubber plantations required an investment of
rupiahs 60 million. The six LO players were able to put up
the investment by pooling their capital. After 20 years, their
cumulative return, which amounted to rupiahs 836 million,
was better compared to scenario A (i.e., if they had invested
in MHR—see Table 3).
Communication within each group increases the liveli-
hood choices. Instead of acting individually, the LO players
pooled their capital and established a new rubber plantation.
Individually, each player does not have suﬃcient money
to invest in his/her rubber plantation. This situation helps
explain why most community rubber plantations now are old
and unproductive. Collective action in the form of collective
investment provides more choices to local communities.
3.3. Scenario C: Communication and Collaboration among All
Players. In this scenario, all 10 players could communicate
and collaborate. Hence, the players can evaluate each strategy
with respect to their own individual interests, as well as their
share in the “collective benefits,” if they cooperate. They
discussed diﬀerent individual and collective strategies. The
results are shown in Figure 6. Eventually, they selected a
strategy, and came up with a plan to invest in oil palm (cell
19) which needed rupiahs 90 million as initial investments.
Nine players pooled their resources to meet the initial
investment cost. After 20 years, the cumulative return was
about rupiahs 1184 million (see Table 4).
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Table 2: The players’ cumulative revenue under scenario A (million rupiahs).
Time
Without land (NLO) With land (LO)
Total cumulative revenue
Cumulative revenue Invest Return Cumulative revenue Invest Return
0 40 0 0 60 0 0 100
1 40 0 0 52 8 0 92
2 40 0 0 52 0 0 92
3 40 0 0 52 0 0 92
4 40 0 0 52 0 0 92
5 40 0 0 52 0 0 92
6 40 0 0 52 0 0 92
7 40 0 0 52 0 0 92
8 40 0 20 52 0 320 432
9 60 0 0 364 8 0 424
10 60 0 0 364 0 0 424
11 60 0 0 364 0 0 424
12 60 0 0 364 0 0 424
13 60 0 0 364 0 0 424
14 60 0 0 364 0 0 424
15 60 0 0 364 0 0 424
16 60 0 20 364 8 320 764
17 80 0 0 676 0 0 756
18 80 0 0 676 0 0 756
19 80 0 0 676 0 0 756
20 80 0 0 676 0 0 756
Table 3: Scenario B: the players’ cumulative revenue under scenario B (million rupiahs).
Time
Without land (NLO) With land (LO)
Total cumulative revenue
Cumulative revenue Invest Return Cumulative revenue Invest Return
0 40 0 0 60 0 0 100
1 40 0 0 0 60 0 40
2 40 0 0 0 0 0 40
3 40 0 0 0 0 0 40
4 40 0 0 0 0 0 40
5 40 0 0 0 0 0 40
6 40 0 0 0 0 60 100
7 40 0 0 60 0 60 160
8 40 0 20 120 0 60 240
9 60 0 0 180 0 60 300
10 60 0 0 240 0 60 360
11 60 0 0 300 0 60 420
12 60 0 0 360 0 48 468
13 60 0 0 408 0 48 516
14 60 0 0 456 0 48 564
15 60 0 0 504 0 48 612
16 60 0 20 552 0 48 680
17 80 0 0 600 0 48 728
18 80 0 0 648 0 36 764
19 80 0 0 684 0 36 800
20 80 0 0 720 0 36 836
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Table 4: The players’ cumulative revenue under scenario C (million rupiahs).
Time
Without land (NLO) With land (LO)
Total cumulative revenue
Cumulative revenue Invest Return Cumulative revenue Invest Return
0 40 0 0 60 0 0 100
1 10 0 0 0 90 0 10
2 10 0 0 0 0 0 10
3 10 0 0 0 0 0 10
4 10 0 0 0 0 0 10
5 10 0 0 0 0 0 10
6 10 0 0 0 0 90 100
7 10 0 0 90 0 90 190
8 10 0 20 180 0 90 300
9 30 0 0 270 0 90 390
10 30 0 0 360 0 90 480
11 30 0 0 450 0 90 570
12 30 0 0 540 0 72 642
13 30 0 0 612 0 72 714
14 30 0 0 684 0 72 786
15 30 0 0 756 0 72 858
16 30 0 20 828 0 72 950
17 50 0 0 900 0 72 1022
18 50 0 0 972 0 54 1076
19 50 0 0 1026 0 54 1130
20 50 0 0 1080 0 54 1184
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 14 15
16 17 18 19 20
21 22 23 24 25
Figure 5: Scenario B: six players with land pool their money to
invest in rubber plantations.
The game was iterated twice. In the case of scenarios A
and B, the players came up with the same strategy in the
second iteration. This is not the case with scenario C where
the players came up with a diﬀerent strategy in the second
iteration. Instead of investing all their money in oil palm,
they decided to have two kinds of investments: MHR (cells
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 14 15
16 17 18 19 20
21 22 23 24 25
Figure 6: Scenario C: nine players pool their money to invest in oil
palm plantation.
20, 22, and 23) and rubber plantation (see cell 9—Figure 7).
As a result, after 20 years, their net revenue was higher than
in previous scenarios (see Table 5).
Figure 8 describes a comparative diagram of the cumu-
lative revenues associated with each scenario. The net
present values (NPVs) of these scenarios, at 8% and 12%
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Table 5: The players’ cumulative revenue under scenario C1 (million rupiahs).
Time
Without land (NLO) With land (LO)
Total cumulative revenue
Cumulative revenue Invest Return Cumulative revenue Invest Return
0 40 0 0 60 0 0 100
1 34 0 0 0 66 0 34
2 34 0 0 0 0 0 34
3 34 0 0 0 0 0 34
4 34 0 0 0 0 0 34
5 34 0 0 0 0 0 34
6 34 0 0 0 0 60 94
7 34 0 0 60 0 60 154
8 34 0 20 120 0 300 474
9 54 0 0 414 6 60 528
10 54 0 0 474 0 60 588
11 54 0 0 534 0 60 648
12 54 0 0 594 0 48 696
13 54 0 0 642 0 48 744
14 54 0 0 690 0 48 792
15 54 0 0 738 0 48 840
16 54 0 20 786 0 288 1148
17 74 0 0 1068 6 48 1190
18 74 0 0 1116 0 36 1226
19 74 0 0 1152 0 36 1262
20 74 0 0 1188 0 36 1298
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 14 15
16 17 18 19 20
21 22 23 24 25
Figure 7: Scenario C1: six players invest in rubber plantation (cell
9), and the other three players invest in MHR (cells 20, 22, and 23).
interest rates, are summarized in Table 6. The table shows
that scenario C1 is the most profitable option with the
highest NPV. Scenario C also gave consistently higher NPVs
compared to scenarios A and B. Scenario A has a higher NPV
than scenario B at 12% mainly because of its high revenue
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Figure 8: The total net revenue collected by 10 players during 20
years (in million rupiahs) for Scenario A, B, C and C1.
values early in the rotation. Scenario B has a higher NPV
value than scenario A at lower interest rates (e.g., 8%).
The relative land diversities for scenarios A, B, C, and C1
were 40.8, 27.9, 27.6, and 34.9, respectively. It was assumed
that the land outside MHP forest was homogeneous, and
that even though planted with Acacia (scenario A), diversity
would increase. However, the probability of fires during the
period of community investment is lower in scenarios B and
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Table 6: Saving and returns for each scenario (million rupiahs).
Time (t)
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario C1
Cumulative
Saving and
return at
time t
Cumulative
Saving and
return at
time t
Cumulative
Saving and
return at
time t
Cumulative
Saving and
return at
time t
0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1 92 92 40 40 10 10 34 34
2 92 0 40 0 10 0 34 0
3 92 0 40 0 10 0 34 0
4 92 0 40 0 10 0 34 0
5 92 0 40 0 10 0 34 0
6 92 0 100 60 100 90 94 60
7 92 0 160 60 190 90 154 60
8 432 340 240 80 300 110 474 320
9 424 −8 300 60 390 90 528 54
10 424 0 360 60 480 90 588 60
11 424 0 420 60 570 90 648 60
12 424 0 468 48 642 72 696 48
13 424 0 516 48 714 72 744 48
14 424 0 564 48 786 72 792 48
15 424 0 612 48 858 72 840 48
16 764 340 680 68 950 92 1148 308
17 756 −8 728 48 1022 72 1190 42
18 756 0 764 36 1076 54 1226 36
19 756 0 800 36 1130 54 1262 36
20 756 0 836 36 1184 54 1298 36
NPV 583 697 1,028 1,108
C because both scenarios did not involve Acacia plantations.
Scenario C1, which is more profitable than scenario C, also
has higher landscape diversity than scenario C.
The game shows that communication and collaboration
among the players can produce more options to improve
the communities’ livelihood by their resources. Through this
collaboration, collective investment can emerge. It is easy
to see that rubber plantations are more profitable than the
MHR scheme; however, people in South Sumatra currently
cannot renew their rubber smallholdings for the lack of the
required capital amounting to rupiahs 6 million per hectare.
If they can anticipate the net return of collective investment,
then they may realize that there is a chance for future renewal.
If this collective action is extended to community
members without land who are currently working for the
MHBM scheme, their net return will even be higher. In the
first game iteration, they collaboratively planted oil palm,
but in the second they concurrently planted rubber and
participated in the MHR scheme. From the simple case study,
one can see evidence of the learning process through playing
the game. It is hard to determine whether an optimum
solution will emerge automatically if they cooperate, but
it is possible that the optimum solution will be discovered
over time. Regardless optimality of chosen strategy is not
as important as social acceptability of chosen strategy. In a
case as complex as the problem addressed in this case study,
“pareto optimality” may only exist theoretically, but may be
too elusive, if not impossible, to determine.
3.4. Institutional Implications. Communication had been
shown to be an eﬀective mechanism for increasing the likeli-
hood that stakeholders choose benefit-sharing strategies. For
instance, in this study, communication facilitated through
RPG enabled the players to explore various strategies that
increased their cumulative incomes. These collective strate-
gies emerged, in part, from the participants’ realization that
they might get better returns given the payoﬀ structure and
if they collaborate and develop a group strategy.
The experiment demonstrated the importance of com-
munication and its potential in increasing community
benefits. This is particularly true when communication is
provided as a mechanism for the players to envisage a
coordinated strategy. For instance, in this experimental pilot
study, an ex-postapplication of RPG at the community led
to the formation of communication institutions such as a
community forum at the village level and a multistakeholder
forum at the district level. However, community institutions
are not costless and are not formed easily and quickly. The
community and other stakeholders need to invest time and
eﬀort to establish these forums or arenas. This is particularly
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significant because the communities surrounding the MHP
plantations, used as the experimental case study, are subsis-
tence community where most people live poorly with less
than 1 USD per day [23]. Hence, the MHP plantations influ-
ence the traditional livelihoods of the community. Therefore,
the level of cooperation among community members may
be strongly influenced by inherent competition among the
communities for the benefits derived from the plantations.
This makes the formation of community forums even more
diﬃcult, but strategically significant.
Communication among community members as well as
the eﬀort to arrive at a coordinated strategy may slow the
decision-making process seeking fruitful partnership with
MHP. However, since forest- and land-related activities are
long-term investments, and realizing that impatience may
undermine long-term social and ecological sustainability
[17], a slower and more deliberate decision-making process
particularly at the beginning is reasonable.
Coordinated strategy involves producing rules for shar-
ing benefit and cost of any land use option. In the case study,
the establishment of a communication institution, such as
a formal forum, was deemed critical to the enforcement
of these rules. Without this rule enforcement capability,
problems related to free riders and rent seekers can emerge
easily. Moreover, the problem of elite capture as described
by Platteau and Gaspart [16] can also diminish. Learning
from RPG experiment, the real stakeholders in Muara
Enim District agreed to establish a forum, called “Forum
Sebahu Sejalan.” This forum was equipped with an explicit
constitution and rule, called anggaran dasar and anggaran
rumah tangga, to guide the organization and execution of the
forum.
The forum is envisioned to serve as a mechanism to
bridge the community and MHP’s interests. Through the
coordinated strategy, and particularly the formal forum,
the community is positioned in an environment, where
they are able to bargain and negotiate with MHP. On the
other hand, MHP also benefits from the forum through
reducing transaction cost of negotiation. Without the formal
forum, MHP traditionally deals with individual community
members and leaders. With the formal forum, a more
balanced partnership can emerge from discussions between
community members, united by the common strategy, and
MHP. For instance, in an ex-postapplication of RPG, MHP
has agreed to give a more transparent figure about the
overall plantation costs and returns in response to requests
made by the community. MHP also agreed to lend money
to the community to enable them to make better land use
investments as well as pursue small plantation operational
contracts with MHP such as weeding and harvesting. This
balanced and transparent partnership can only make the
partnership more resilient. The forum provides both parties
with a common ground to negotiate about regular issues
such as profit sharing at the end of rotation, as well as
sensitive issues such as land property ownership and access
to resources.
In the case study, the “Forum Sebahu Sejalan” is also
a place where the local government of Muara Enim, South
Sumatra communicates and negotiates with community
members and representatives. At the same time, local com-
munity can participate and influence policy formulation on
forest plantations such as benefit sharing, plantation extent,
production targets, and location. This forum is envisioned
as a mechanism to make the decentralization policies
work better for forest plantations at the district level. The
forum, its constitution, and rules play a role as institutional
mechanisms that can encourage the local community to
cooperate with government oﬃcials and to promote more
interactions between less powerful community members and
government oﬃcials.
4. Conclusion
This paper described an experiment that examines the
RPG method and how it can be used by stakeholders
to explore community-company partnerships. Based on
the experiences gained from the experimental case study,
one can conclude that the RPG method can help explore
these partnerships, make them more transparent, and create
win-win scenarios for all stakeholders. From the simple
case study, the following were noted: (a) CORMAS is a
useful platform to develop and carry out simple spatially
explicit role-playing game (RPG), (b) collaboration and
communication can design collective strategies that help
improve community livelihoods in the future, (c) the best
solutions, or win-win relationships among stakeholders, can
be learned over continual RPG iteration, and (d) RPG game
can help players anticipate potential outcomes of their own
decisions.
Role-playing game gave players insight into how col-
lective investment is preferable to improve their future
livelihoods. The players learned as they discussed, played,
and analyzed the game. The game mimicked the inter-
action between communities living near the MHP forest
plantations, although it was simplified so that the exercise
might be applied to partnerships involving other local
communities and forest plantation companies. The results
from the game also provided the rationale to establish a
costless communication institution called “Forum Sebahu
Sejalan” in the District of Muara Enim, South Sumatra . The
forum can play a significant role in building more resilient
relationship between local community and MHP. At the
same time, the forum acts as avenue for local community to
access the government oﬃcials and to make decentralization
works better in forest plantations at the district and the
village levels.
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